Introduction
Ample media coverage,i nr ecent years,h as focused attention on the separatist Ultra-Orthodox communities,aswell as on the more culturally accommodating but politically radical groupsofJewish Settlersand would be Te mple-Builders in Israel. Those segments of Judaism have been on the rise in the last generation, both demographically and institutionally. As the recent newsf rom Israel demonstrate these fundamentalist groups are currently prominent on the political scene,affecting national policies.The declarations and actions of some members of the groups in relation to Israeli settlements and the Temple Mount, or Haram al-Sharif,have played apart in the escalatingmistrust between Moslems and Jews in Israel, the territories it occupies,and beyond.
Few, however, are aware of the history and development of the Jewish fundamentalist movements and the variedc haracteristicso ft he many groups that make up these camps.This paper aims to place the movements withinthe larger social, cultural and religious contextsi nw hich they have evolveda nd to which they have reacted. Thep aper will point to two majorc amps of contemporary Jewish fundamentalists that differ from each other in their theologies,communal structures,life styles,and political choices.Itwill also point to mutual influences, common characteristics and shared perceptions.
Jewish religious fundamentalists take affirmative stands, upholding and strengthening tradition in face of other optionsinJ ewish culture.T hey insist on the validity and authority of the Jewish sacreds criptures,s ee special merits in studying the texts,and are highly protective of the narratives the texts offer. Both groupsa re messianically-oriented, but while the Zionist-Orthodox believes in taking an activerole in history,the Ultra-Orthodox have often objected to such attempts.
1 While the Ultra-Orthodox take their model from the alter heim, Eastern European Jewish society before Communism, Nazism and emigration to western countries or Israelbrought it to an end, Zionist Orthodoxg roupsh ave come instead to promote the Land of Israel as af ocal point of their political vision. 
Fundamentalist Ultra-Orthodoxy
Thelargest of the religious fundamentalist movements within contemporary Judaism is This diverse fundamentalist movement started in Central Europe,i nt he nineteenth century,i nr eaction to movements of acculturation and liberalization. 4 It spreadtoJewish communities in other parts of the world,c hanging and evolving in response to new environments and challenges.
Until the turn of the nineteenth century, the term "orthodox" was rarely used to defineJews,but matters changed in the early nineteenth century when leaders of more militant forms of reactive traditional Judaism appearedo nt he scene, declared themselves "orthodox" in contrastt ow hat they considered to be the erring reformers.U ntil such alternatives appearedw ithinJ ewish society,J ews could move away from the faith by converting to another religion, but they could not pick and choose on an individual basis whatelements of their tradition they 1R avitzky 1996, chapter 4. 2O nthe ethos of Ultra-Orthodoxsociety,see Friedman1991. 3I bid. 4K atz 1973. wished to observe.N ow,s uch choices became possible.I nW estern and Central Europe,aswell as in the New World, many Jews liberalized, easing up or givingup completely on dailyo bservance of their tradition. An umber of rabbis and laypersons madedeliberate efforts to bring Judaism to par with the cultural norms of urban Europeans ocieties.
5 Those decidingt ou phold tradition considered the liberalreformers to be misguided, if not outright traitorous. They set out to create astern uncompromising version of traditional Judaism that would not walk the line of compromise and eventual demise of the tradition.
Ultra-Orthodoxy has not been aself-designation.Most members of this camp prefer instead terms that express theirunderstanding of themselves as the utmost loyal followers of the Jewish faith,u sing at times the terms "TorahC amp",o r Haredim,E ager to Follow God, to describe their ideological commitmenta nd cultural environment.
Michael Silberhas pointedout that the Ultra-Orthodox reacted not only to the rise of reform or secularf orms of Jewish life,b ut also to the appearance of acculturated forms of Orthodoxy whose holders had wished to makeo bservant forms of Judaism compatible with modern life.
6 TheU ltra-Orthodox have claimed that even minor attempts at acculturation or reform could be the beginningo fadecline in commitment and deterioration in the standards of observing the faith that end with thecomplete disintegration of the tradition. The first Ultra-Orthodox leaders lashed out at early Orthodox thinkers,such as Moses Mendelssohn, and even at Samson Raphael Hirsch and Azriel Hildesheimer, who were,i nf act, founders of am ore firm form of Orthodox Judaism and militated against reforms of the faith.
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If Moses Mendelssohnwas thethinkermost associatedwith the beginning of a moderate,a cculturated form of Jewish Orthodoxy, Moses Sofer( Schreiber) of Pressburg (Bratislava), known as the Hatam Sofer (1762-1839), was the early founderofUltra-Orthodoxy.Spiritual leader of the utmost Eastern urban center of the Habsburg Empire,S ofer established ay eshivat hat became ab astion of anti-modernism in Central and Eastern Europe. TheHatam Sofer pun on aT almudic ruling, "Kol hadash asur min ha Torah",the Torah forbids everything that is new,became abattle cry of Ultra-Orthodoxy.Ithas reflected the dialecticsofthe new movement, which has come about within the contextofmodernity yet carried ab anner of opposition to modernism and acculturation, and while thoroughly opposing reforms,m ade profound theological and practical changes in the tradition. It was perhapsnot surprising thatthe HatamSofer held expectationsfor the imminent arrival of the Messiah to usher in aglobal righteous age and brings about the redemption of Israel. In contrast to the newly emerging circlesofliberal Jews who adopted at that timeprogressive millennial viewsand hoped to build the Kingdom of God on Earththrough education, the spreading of the values of the Enlightenment, technological advancement, and political reforms, the Hatam Sofer believed that the messianic era would not be ushered in through human efforts,b ut rather through divine intervention and busied himself in trying to calculate the exactd ate of its arrival. In that regard there are some striking similarities betweenthe ideologies and attitudes of Ultra-Orthodoxyand those of fundamentalist movements that have come about in other religious traditions in the late modern era.
8 Like other such movements,U ltra-Orthodoxy should be understood as areactionary development in the history of Judaism. If in previous generations,t here was more leeway for rabbis to issue accommodating rulings, and for laypersons to balance the demandsofday to day life with those of tradition and the halakha, now regulations and standards have become more stringent and greateremphasize put on separation from outside cultures including othergroups of Jews.
In their declaredi deology as well as in their own minds, the Ultra-Orthodox creatednothing new.They have seen themselves as merely preserving the customs and faith of theirfathers and forefathers,which, they have asserted, had remained unaltered throughout the ages.R eligious traditions,h owever, are dynamic by nature and fundamentalist groups, such as the Ultra-Orthodox, tend to be particularly active in re-designing their traditions so as to make them morei nsular and immune to outside influences.W hile opposing changes,U ltra-Orthodox leadersa nd groups have implemented huge changes in Jewish customsa nd standards of observance as well as in the relation between different groups of Jews.
9 Forexample,the Ultra-Orthodox unwillingness to recognize more acculturated or accommodating rabbis as legitimate has brought the older concept of More de Atra, local rabbis as the authoritative halachic figures in their own territories, to an end. Thedynamic nature of fundamentalism is also evident in the significant developments that have taken place as new generations of Ultra-Orthodox have comeonthe scene.Asageneralization, the movement has become more strict and demanding throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Thed ynamic nature of the movementh as been accompanied by huge inner diversity.While from the outside it might look like ahomogeneous camp,itisinfact alarge and diverse religious-cultural movement.
10 Divisions have to do with the areas from which the Ultra-Orthodox have arrived from as wella sb etween Hasidic and non-Hasidic forms of leadership,authority and worship.The camp is composedo fn umerousc ommunitiest hat share the basic cultural values and adheretothe samenarratives on the course of Jewish history,yet differ in small 8F or similar attitudes among Christian fundamentalists, see Marsden 1982; W eber 1983 W eber . 9K atz1998. 10 Friedman 1991 details of appearance and customs.T here are also varying shades of separatism from the outside culture.These communal divisions often result in inner struggles, the building and dissolvingofcoalitions and public institutions and even verbal and physical skirmishes.F or example,m ost Ultra-Orthodox Jews in Israel lend their support to political parties that represent their interests vis avis the Israeli government. However, aminority group considers such political maneuvers to be in violation of the communitysvalues and boycotts the elections.
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While positioning themselves in opposition to modernity and the general culture,t he Ultra-Orthodox have chosen, especially sinceW orld WarI I, to live their livesinlarge cities. They have madeextensive usage of modern technology and international transportation. This has allowed them to build global networks, and uniteo ver common causes.M ost Ultra-Orthodox Jews are of Eastern European origins,and many of them considertraditional Eastern Europeancustoms to represent normative Judaism. Thes eparatist communities in Germany were more acculturated than the Ultra-Orthodox groupsi nE astern Europe and encouraged their male members to obtain general educationa nd professional training, alongside Jewish traditionalschooling,areality that made some Eastern European leaderstreat them with suspicion.Bythe turn of the twentieth century, the Germans and Eastern Europeans cooperatedinestablishingpolitical bodies that came to represent the conservative elements of OrthodoxJ udaismi nt he public and political spheres.B yt hat time the Ultra-Orthodox were reacting strongly to the rise of the Zionist movement, and especially to its Orthodox wing, Hamizrahi.
12 Leaders of Ultra-Orthodox communities,s uch as the Munkatcher Rebbe,Chaim Elazar Spira(1868-1937) and the SatmarRebbe,Joel Teitelbaum (1887 -1979 shared the conviction that the Jews were forbidden "Laalot Bahoma", to re-enter history as active agents.T hey therefore opposed the Zionist agenda vehemently,viewing it as afutile and dangerous attempt. Thefounding of an Ultra-Orthodox party,Agudat Israel, came to present apolitical alternative to Zionistv oices. 13 While inner divisions,s uch as between Hasidic Jews and "opponents", did not disappear, Eastern and Central European traditionalists were now willingtoput aside someoftheir differences and cooperate in order to fight the modernists and strengthen the ideological and spiritual walls around their communities.
AfterW orld WarI,Agudat-Israel became active in anumber of Eastern Europeancountries and in Palestine,expressing opposition to the Zionist movement in international forums.Still, in the mid-1920s,the Ultra-Orthodox party began, on ap ragmatic basis,t oc ooperate with the Zionist establishment. Its leaders wishedt og et their share of certificates for immigration to Palestinea sw ell as budgets and allocations of land. This created ab acklasht ot he more radical 11 On Ultra-Orthodox lifeand institutions,see Heilman 2000. 12 Ravitzky 1996. 13 On Agudat Israel, see Bacon 1996. elements among the Ultra-Orthodox in Jerusalem. In 1937 , Amram Blau (1894 -1974 and others,established NetureiKarta,Defenders of the City,agroupthat in the 1950s-1960s galvanized Ultra-Orthodox antagonists of the newly created state and demonstrated in Jerusalem against the desecration of the Sabbath.
14 This group gave voice to aminority within the Ultra-Orthodox. Most chose to operate within the system in order to protectt heir communitysi nterests. Avraham Yishaya Karelitz (1878 Karelitz ( -1953 , known as the Hazon Ish, emerged as as piritual leader,giving voice to Ultra-Orthodoxy at large,inopposing the conscription of women as wellasofyeshiva students.
Thedeferment from conscription, which the Israeli governments grantedtoits Ultra-Orthodox coalition partners,proved detrimental to the development of the community,w hich, since the 1950s,t urned studies in yeshivot,r abbinicala cademies, previously ap rivilege of as mall elite,i nto routine for all young men. While Zionist Orthodoxa lso obtained somer abbinical studies,f or the UltraOrthodox it has become away of life.Men continue their studies after marriage, while their wives work for al iving. 15 As ar ule,t he Ultra-Orthodox remaini n coalition with governments,whoever heads them, to ensure the continuation of this arrangement and the integrityoftheir communities.
Manyo bservers thought,i nt he aftermath of the Holocaust, that Ultra-Orthodoxy would not be able to overcomet he deadly blows that the Nazi death machine and the Communist regimesh ave dealt the traditionalist Jewish communities in EasternEurope. However,tothe amazement of many,includingthe Ultra-Orthodox themselves,the community has risen up,like aphoenix, from the ashes,showing signs of vitality and growth.Contrary to warnings, America,Israel and centers in Australia, Canada, England and Belgium, proved to be congenial to the reconstruction and thriving of Ultra-Orthodox communities.W hile previously traditionalist Jews,w ho settled in the New World, saw an eed to acculturate quickly in order to accommodate successfully to their new environments, the post-Holocaust Ultra-Orthodox migrants saw mattersd ifferently.T hey wishedtomaintainmany of their customs,including their distinctive attire,and built an independent educational infrastructure that has enhanced the communitysability to retain most of its children within the fold.
Thes eparatist, seemingly archaic,c haractero fU ltra-Orthodoxs ocieties brought sociologists and anthropologists,aswell as journalists and writers,totake speciali nterest in the variousa spects of their lives.S ome are fascinated by the arranged marriages that are the norm in the community,while renegade female writers,such as Yochi Brandeis or Judith Rotem,point to the sometimes difficult position of women, who are married of young, and whocarry most of the burden of raisinglarge families.Ultra-Orthodox women give birth to averagely five and a 14 Inbari 2016. 15 There is an extensive literature from the perspective of women on the division of labor in the Ultra-Orthodox community.
half childreninthe United States and seven childreninIsrael, about three times more than liberal Jewish women in thesec ountries. 16 Especially in Israel, most Ultra-Orthodox live an economically frugal existence.Ins pite of an impressive network of mutual aid and extensive government support, many in community live in poverty,d epriving themselveso ft he luxurieso fw estern consumer societies.
17
Relationships between the Ultra-Orthodox community and the liberals egments of Israelis ociety have become strenuous.M any secular Jews resent the separatist nature of the Ultra-Orthodox community,a nd the refrainingf rom economic activity of so many Ultra-Orthodox men. Likewise,the Ultra-Orthodox have not celebrated Israeli civil holidays and have not recitedp rayers for the safety and well-being of the state.T he exemptf rom military service has been a huge source of contentioninacountry that has had ongoing conscription since its inception.
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Still, the community has been on the growth. In addition to ar emarkable demographic growth, sincethe late 1960s,itreceived unexpected reinforcements from apost-modernist movementofreturn to traditionthat has brought tens of thousands of young men and women to abandon open liberal societies and join the more conservative Ultra-Orthodox. 19 Rejecting much of the modernist worldview,w hich their grandparents generation had embraced, the new adherents included artists,s oldiers,f ormer Kibbutz members,a nd childreno ft he veteran Israeli elitesand, in America, also academicians and professionals.T he growing trend has boosted the morale of the Ultra-Orthodox. Here are liberal Jews turning their backs on the freedoms and opportunitiese mbodiedi nt he open, secular society, "coming back" into the fold.An umber of Ultra-Orthodoxg roups and leadersd ecided to create venues of outreach in ordert of urther enlarge the communitysranks.Their mode of evangelism is based on the understanding that becoming observant and joiningUltra-Orthodox life is along process involving extensive studies.F or that purpose they have createdalargenumber of yeshivot for beginners,anovelty in Jewish life.
Thegrowthofthe Ultra-Orthodox community and the self-understanding of its members,w ho see themselves as representativeso ft he true and authentic tradition, has affected the more acculturated ZionistOrthodox. Thetrend since the 1960s has been towards more rigid observance and greateracceptance of UltraOrthodox norms.B yt he 1980s,Z ionist Orthodox have attempted to combine both sets of values and standards. 20 The Hardalim,U ltra-Orthodox Zionists, coupledU ltra-Orthodox norms of pietya nd observance with am essianic nationalist faith. Many in the Settlersmovement have promoted this combination.
In the 1980s-2010s,the veteran, almost exclusively Ashkenazi, Ultra-Orthodox community,was both strengthened and challengedbyalarge movement of religious revivaland return to the roots of Mizrahi Jews in Israel. Previously,m ost Jews from Middle-Eastern and North-African countrieswere mildly traditional, with only aminority choosing secular outlooks or adheringtoOrthodox norms. Thenew movement changed that reality and brought tens of thousands of Mizrahi Jews to adopt both Ultra-Orthodox standards of piety and anti-modernist stands.
21 Them ovement also promoted ethnic pridea nd the preservation of Mizrahi culture and tradition. It created parallel political, educational, rabbinical and welfare institutions similar to those of the veteran Ultra-Orthodox community and used its new political power to obtain extensive government support.
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Thepolitical influence of the Ultra-Orthodox has been on the rise in Israel. As arule,the Ultra-Orthodox parties offer the government backing in matters that relate to security,foreign-policy, and the economy,inexchange for allowingthem exemption from military service,c ultural autonomy and financing for separate educationaland housing systems. Ultra-Orthodox parties oftenbecame essential members of the coalition, and the budgets allocated for their communityseducational and housing projects have grown considerably.S imilar developments have taken place on the local level,s uch as in Jerusalemsm unicipal politics, where the Ultra-Orthodox have successfully demanded, in return for their support, to have their neighborhoods closed to traffic on the Sabbath and holidays. This has affected the charactero fJ erusalem, where manyn eighborhoods and schoolshave become Ultra-Orthodox. Outside of Israel, the Ultra-Orthodox as a rule do not run for offices,but lend their support to those candidatesthat respect their cultural separatism and educationalautonomy.The ZionistOrthodoxhave been activeonthe political front.
The Zionist Orthodox
ZionistOrthodoxy has come on the scene ashort while after the rise of political Zionism. Thegrouprepresented aminority voice within both Jewish Orthodoxy and Zionism.I ts proponents established HaMizrahi,amoderate politicalp arty that saw its missioni nc arving an iche for observant Jews who supported the Zionist agenda. HaPoel Hamizrahi,which combined Laborpolitics with aminimalist form of observance,b ecame al arger political party, althought he two parties united after the birth of the state of Israel. TheSettlers movement receivedenormous boost with the rise of the Likud to power in 1977, moving fromahandful of small shanty towns to nicely built neighborhoods subsidizedb yg overnment funding. TheZ ionist Orthodox have mobilized politically to defendtheir settlements from possible restrictions that the Israeli government mightimpose and to ensure government support for the enlargement of the Settlements project. In spite of the Israeli withdrawal fromGaza, the Settlers community has grown considerably,reaching hundreds of thousands of people.Ithas created its own subculture,complete with its own dress code,a mixture of countercultural attire and Ultra-Orthodox norms,a nd independent media ventures.
Whilethe Settlers community is highly devotedt oI sraela nd its sons play a growing role in its military,members of the community have at times takenthe law into their hands.I n1 983, the Israeli security services discovered cells of undergroundmilitants amongthe Settlersthat were stocking arms and ammunition in preparation for apossible clash with the Israeli state and its security forces,incase of an Israeli attempt to withdrawfrom the occupied territories and evacuate the settlements. 25 There have alsobeen at times incidentsofviolence directed against Palestinians,allegedly in retaliation against violence directedagainst Jews.These have included the destructionoftrees,injuring mayorsofPalestinian towns,and the burning of aPalestinian homethat resulted in fatalities. While most Settlers have not resorted to underground activities or to sabotage or harassment of Palestinians,t he Settlers camp as aw hole has stoodo nt he radical side of the Israeli political and ideological spectrum and many have come to see it as a potential obstacle to apeace agreement and to an atmosphereofreconciliation between Arabsand Jews.
Building the Temple
Of special concern for Israeli security,a sw ell as peace-hopefuls,i nI srael and other countries, has been the possibility that messianically-orientedradical Jews or Christians might heart the Muslim mosques on the Temple Mount and bring about aregional doomsday. 26 In order to appreciate this fear, one has to examine the role of the Templea nd the Land of Israel in Jewish and Christian thought.
TheT emple in Jerusalem hadbeen acentral institution in Israelite religion,as well as in the Judaism of the Second Temple period. ForJews of that period, the Te mple served as the ultimate spiritual point on earth, ap lace where it was possible for them to atone for their sins and reconcilew ith God in ad efinite manner. Pilgrimages to the Temple in Jerusalem wereconsidered essential rites. TheT emple developed into au nifying symbol for ag rowingly diverse Jewish community around the Mediterraneanworld. Thedestruction of the Temple in 70 CE created thereforeaserious vacuum in Jewish communal and spiritual life. Instead of aphysicaltemple,rabbinical Judaismput its premium on sacredtexts, and promoted a"temple in time",asthe weekly Sabbath had becomeaholy day, similarinsanctity to aholy place.J ews purified themselves in honor of the Sabbath and enteredthe holy day in the samemanner they would enter aholy place, cleaning their bodies,w earing specialc loths,p reparing festive meals,l ighting candles and recite special prayers.Synagogues,"houses of gatherings" in Hebrew, came about duringthe Second Temple period,and developed, after the Te mples destruction, into houses of worship and learning,w here Jews prayed and read sacred texts.
Still, Jews prayed to God to gather them back to Zion, rebuild Jerusalem, recreate the Te mple and enable them to fully atone for their sins.T he Temple came to symbolize redemption.R abbis spent timeo ni ssues relating to the Te mple,its measures,sacrificial system, and the alms and donations presented to it. Most rabbinical authorities throughout the Middle-Ages and Modern Era have viewed the TempleM ount as being as sacred as it was when the Te mple was standing.
27 TheMishnah, the post-Biblicalcompilation of lore and law,outlined the variousdegrees of sanctityofareas on the Te mple Mount and the rituals of purification people needed to perform in ordert oe nter thesea reas.J ews have 26 Ariel 2001. 27 Mishnah, Tr actate Middot. Measures. been required to purify themselveswith the ashes of ared heifer before entering the Mount, although thereare no longer red heifers to be found. Rabbis have also feared that Jews mights tep on restricted sacred ground,s uch as the Holyo f Holies,onto which ordinary Jews,and even ordinary priests,were not allowed to enter. Most Jews have accepted the rabbinical ban and saw entrancetothe Temple Mount as taboo.However,Jews had not much to say about the manner in which the Te mple Mount was governed.Between the destruction of the Te mple in 70 CE and 1967, the Te mple Mount had been ruled by Pagans, Christians and Muslims.In the seventha nd eighth centuryC E, the new rulers of the city have turnedt he mountain into asacred Muslimsite,building anumberofmosques and chapels. Jewish movements that have strived to build the Temple would not have carried their activities the way they did if it were not for evangelical Christians providing encouragement and assistance.C hristian thinkers had traditionally seen the Te mple as redundant after Jesus sacrifice on the Cross, and interpreted the destruction of the Te mple in 70 CE as resulting from the Jewish unwillingness to acknowledge Jesus role and mission. Theidea that the Jews should go back to Palestine and rebuild Jerusalem and the Te mpleb ecame predominanta mong Christian messianic groups, especially pietist and evangelical Protestants.A fter the 1967 war,evangelicalswith messianic yearnings have come more than before to expect the building of the Te mple at the end of the currentera, in preparation for the return of the Messiah to earth. In such scenarios,itisoften Antichrist,an imposter of the Messiah, who is expected to achieve global power that would initiate the building of the Te mple.The Te mple,orrather its rebuilding,seemed to evangelical Christians to be the one event standingbetweenthis era and the next.
In the late 1970s and the 1980s,premillennialist Christians and groupsofnationalist-Orthodox Jews,who were interested in the building of the Te mple,discovered each other. Such Christianshave received reassurance for their messianic faith from Jews who were studying the Te mple rituals,ormanufacturing utensils to be used for sacrificialpurposes according to biblical or Talmudic measures,or trying to breed an ew brand of heifers.S imilarly,O rthodox Jews received reassurances from Christianinterest and support. Initially,Jewish proponents of the building of the Te mpledid not appreciate the Christianfaith more than Christian messianic groups appreciated the intrinsic value of the Jewish faith, but they saw such details as being beside the point. Theimportant thingfor them has been the Christian willingness to support their work.
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Christian proponentsofbuilding the Te mple have made efforts to discoverthe exact site of the Te mple.Some have searched for the lost Ark of the Covenant, 30 Inbari 2009 . 31 Ariel 2013 adding at ouch of adventurea nd mystery to ap otentially explosivet opic. The search for the "Lost Ark"has inspired anumberofnovels and amovie based in part on areal life figure.Some premillennialist evangelicalshave also searched for the ashes of the red heifer, which are necessary,a ccording to the Jewish law,i n order to allow Jews to enter the Te mple Mount, while others have supported Jewish attempts at breeding red heifers or began breeding such heifers on their own.
Pat Robertson, the renowned leader of the 700 Club and ao ne-time presidentialh opeful, offered his support and hospitality to Gershon Solomon. In August 1991, the 700 Club airedaninterview with Solomon. Robertson described Solomonsg roupa ss truggling to gain the rightful place on the Te mple Mount. "Wewill never have peace", Robertson declared, "until the Mount of the House of the Lord is restored." Solomon, for his part, describedhis missionasembodying the promise for au niversal redemption." Itsn ot just as truggle for the Temple Mount, itsastruggle for the […] redemption of the world", he declared.
Examination of the mutual enchantment between evangelical Christians and Orthodox Jews,s uch as Robertsona nd Solomon, shows mutuali nfluences.S olomon,f or example,c laims to have divine revelations, not unlike thosea mong evangelical charismatic Christians.Jewish would-be builders of the Temple have also changed theiropinion on Christians,impressed by the keen Christian interest and support.
32 Those Christians,t hey discovered, were more enthusiastic about the prospect of building the Te mple than most Jews.The theology and message of people,s uch as Gershon Solomon, has come to include Christians as important participantsinthe divine dramaofsalvation. Resurfacingthe traditionalJ ewish idea that since the days of Noah all of humanity is in covenant with God, Jewish radicalthinkers of the Settlers camp are claiming that Christians too have to strive and makeaneffort towardsthe advancement of the messianic times.
In assessing the tensions embodied in the struggle for the Te mpleMount, one needs to take into consideration not only the messianic fervor of Jews and Christians,but the strong feelingsofthe local Muslim community and the support and sympathy of Muslims worldwide. An adversarial symbiosis has developed at times between Muslims and the Jewish and Christian Te mple Builders.T he agenda of some Jewish and Christiangroups, who wish to changethe status quoon the Temple Mount,h as served to fuel and enhance the Palestinian claims. Throughout the 1970s-2010s,the Te mple Mount, or the HaramalSharif as it is known to Muslims,became asymbol of national liberation for Palestinian Muslims and their regardfor the Mount has become even more pronounced. Sovereignty over the Mount played aprominent part in the peace talks that took place between Palestinians and Israelis in the late 1990s,and Ariel Sharonsvisit to the Te mple Mount in September 2000 was the startingpoint of the Second Intifada. Protecting the Te mpleMount mosques became apriority for the Israeli security 32 Ibid.
services. Even symbolic attempts to claim the Te mple Mount as aJewish site have had explosiveconsequences.OnSukkot,the Feast of the Tabernacles,inOctober 1990, the Te mple Mount Faithful planned to enter the Te mpleM ount, and this time to lay acorner stone for the future Te mple.The police,however, refused to allow them entrance to the Te mple Mount and they left the place.B ut Muslim worshipers on the Mount felt threatened, and threw rocks at Jewish worshipers at the Wailing Wall. Thea tmosphere became volatile,a sM uslim demonstrators chased the small policeu nit out of the Mountain, and Israeli anti-riotp olice stormedthe area ashort while later.Dozens of demonstrators and police officers were killed or wounded. Thep ossibility that acts inspired by groupsh olding to messianic hopes would bring about am ini-apocalypse therefore became ac oncern for thosetakinginterest in the developments in the MiddleEast. Should the mosques be seriouslydamaged, all hell might break loose.
Conclusion
At first glance Ultra-Orthodoxy and Zionist-Orthodoxy are very different communities that hold to ideologies far removedf rom each other and subscribe to very differentl ife styles.Acloser look reveals,h owever, strong similarities between the world views,a gendasa nd life decisions of the Ultra and Zionist Orthodox. Both groupsrelatewith owe to the Jewish sacredtexts as the foundation of theirreligious tradition. Both view the biblical narratives as the basis of what they consider to be the special relationship between God, the people of Israel, and the Land of Israel. Both communities are thoroughlymessianic in their theologies and yearnings,directing their lives towards the arrival of the messianic times.The two groupsh ave promoted different paths to achieve that goal. Since 1967, the ZionistOrthodox have become more nationalist and right wing than other segments of the Jewish population. However,w hile the Ultra-Orthodox have traditionally resented the politically pro-active expansionist Zionistagenda, they too see themselves as troopers in Godsarmy,struggling, through prayers,studies and righteous livestobring in the messianic age.Anumber of Ultra-Orthodox groups, most notablythe Hasidic group Chabad, have also become engaged in outreach, wishingtobring more people to fulfill the commandments as ameans of ushering in the messianic times.Within the Zionist Orthodox movement, the standards of daily observance and commitmentt os tudying Talmudic texts have also grown considerably.
Thedifferences in life decisions have alsobecomenarrower. TheZionist Orthodoxhave embraced modern science,incorporated liberal education alongside the study of sacred texts,a nd have allowed women ag rowing amounto ft raditional education. Zionist Orthodox women have abandoned,however, the more carefree attire andp ersonal appearance in favor of full cover of their hair and body and while they study,obtain degrees,and build careers, they make agreater effort at pro-creation than their mothers have made,a nd in such aw ay help enlarget he community and ensure the continuity of the Jewish people.I nt hat both groups have been successful. Their numbersa nd rolew ithin the Jewish community has been on the rise,altering the characterand agendas of the Jewish people as awhole.
